Outline
• Describe trends and (where possible) future projections in prime age market -Population-size and mix of race/ethnicity -Educational attainment and test scores -Size of veteran population -Drug use, crime, arrests -Civilian labor market opportunities
• Discuss combined, or net, effects of separate trends
The IWAR team asked us to evaluate the impact of several specific socioeconomic trends on the supply of potential enlisted recruits aged 17 to 26. The variables of interest are population, educational attainment, test scores, moral qualifications (drug use, crime), and civilian labor market opportunities. How will demographic trends affect the services' ability to meet recruiting goals in the future?
The age group that we focus on reflects the composition of enlisted recruits. All recruits must be under the age of 36, but most are far younger. In 1994, 94 percent were 25 and under [1] . Some analysts focus on the population of 18-to 24-year-olds, while others define the market more or less broadly. The 17-to 26-year-old population currently exceeds the population aged 18 to 24 by about 11 million.
In this document, we discuss trends affecting enlisted supply. Where possible, we present government projections of future trends as well as recent historical data. We then evaluate the net effects of these changes on the military's ability to meet future goals.
Youth attitudes toward the military are significant predictors of enlisted supply. Most of the factors we discuss are reflected in the Youth Attitude Tracking Surveys (YATS), which measure attitudes toward military service. We do not examine the YATS because our purpose is to describe the future demographic changes that underlie changes in attitude. 
--
The single most significant change affecting military recruiting will be in the growing population of youths in the prime recruiting market. The Census Bureau [2] projects that the decade-long decline in the youth population is over. The population aged 17 to 26 will grow at a rate of about 1 percent per year through 2010, and at a lesser rate through 2015. The same pattern applies to the age 18-to 24-year-old population.
These projections are significant for two reasons. First, population is the basic driver of the supply of quality recruits (i.e., the number of high school graduates). Population data are also significant because of their reliability. Compared to other factors affecting recruiting, near-term changes in population can be predicted with a large degree of confidence. Alternative Census Bureau projections (we have shown the middle of three sets of estimates here) show the same pattern (see [2] , p. 90). Across the alternative projections there are small differences in expected population over the next 10 years, but all the estimates indicate growth over this period. Forecasts for years further into the future are, of course, more various. However, many factors affect enlisted supply. The services want highquality recruits-those with high school degrees who score at or above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Youth without high school degrees, and who test poorly, can be recruited at essentially no cost, but the Navy pays between $8,000 and $12,000 (depending on economic conditions) to recruit one high-quality sailor. High school graduation is the single biggest predictor of whether a sailor will complete his or her first term of enlistment [3] . On average between 1993 and 1997, 95 percent of DoD recruits held high school degrees, and 70 percent were in the 50th percentile of the AFQT. Sixty-six percent of military recruits, and 62 percent of Navy recruits, met both criteria.
Not all recruits will be medically or morally qualified to enter. Policies vary by service and over time, but, in general, those with histories of illicit drug use, or who have been convicted of a crime, will require waivers to enter the military. 4
To a large extent, the different quality criteria will overlap; they will be correlated with each other (e.g., drug use and high school graduation rates), and they will all correlate with race, ethnicity, age, and gender.
Economic and cultural factors shape the attractiveness of military service to high-quality potential recruits. The fraction of high school graduates planning to attend college has been increasing. The size of the veteran population has also been found to affect enlistment propensity, perhaps through its impact on exposure to and knowledge of the military [1] .
Number of High School Graduates Is Increasing 
I
Source: [4, 5] I I i 1 1 I To estimate the number of male and female high school graduates, we combined the projections of numbers of graduates with additional, historical NCES data on the gender mix of recent classes [5] . We assumed that 51 percent of future classes would be female. Together, population growth and larger high school graduation classes favor an improved recruiting environment in the future. College enrollment rates, however, have increased steadily over time. Most recruits have no college education at the time of enlistment. High school graduates who do not go to college soon after graduation-termed "noncollege-bound graduates"-constitute the majority of the recruiting market. Recently, the Navy has tried to recruit community college graduates, but those efforts have been small [6] .
This chart shows the percentages of 16-to 24-year-old college students who had graduated from high school during the preceding 12 months. The data include GED recipients and reflect attendance at 2-year and 4-year institutions. Female and male enrollment rates have been increasing, but female graduates are more likely than male graduates to enroll in college. Most observers attribute the enrollment trend to increasing economic returns to college education, and to the expansion of 2-year colleges. Between 1988 and 1998, enrollment at 2-year institutions increased by 19.8 percent.
We were not able to find published forecasts of the percentage of future high school graduation cohorts who will go on to college. We used other estimates to predict the size of the future pool of non-college-bound graduates. One way to predict the number of non-college-bound graduates is to make assumptions about the future propensity of high school graduates to enroll in college. Here, we have assumed that college enrollment within a year of graduation remains fixed at 1997 rates. That is, we assume that 70.3 percent of female high school graduates, and 63.5 percent of male graduates, will enroll in college each year. Under this assumption, the class of 2008 will contain about 145,000 more youth who do not go on to college than did the class of 1998. This translates into a 10-year growth rate in the number of non-college-bound graduates of 16.5 percent.
This growth is in contrast to the 1988-1998 period, when smaller high school graduating classes and increased rates of college enrollment made recruiting more difficult. During that decade, the pool of non-collegebound, recent high school graduates decreased by 24 percent.
The assumption of fixed college enrollment rates may be more realistic for women than for men. The rate for women is already high. If it continued to grow at its 1983-1997 average rate of 1 percentage point per year, it would exceed 80 percent by 2008. This seems unlikely. Therefore, if the female college enrollment rate does increase, it is likely to do so at a rate far lower than has recently been the case. The NCES publishes projections of total enrollment in higher education, which can also be used to estimate the changes in the supply of non-college-bound graduates. Total enrollment differs from the data we have used so far because it includes continuing and returning students as well as recent high school graduates.
This chart (from [6] ) indicates that, between 1998 and 2003, the number of annual high school graduates will grow faster than the number of students enrolled in college. From 2003 through 2008, college enrollment and high school graduation will grow at nearly the same rate. Between 1998 and 2008, college enrollment will grow by 10.2 percent and high school graduation will grow by 16.5 percent. This suggests that the fraction of graduates going on to college within a year of graduation will remain fixed or will decrease.
These data underscore the greater scarcity of non-college-bound high school graduates during the previous decade. Between 1988 and 1993, enrollment at 2-year colleges increased by 14.2 percent, and enrollment at 4-year colleges increased by 6.8 percent. At the same time, the number of high school graduates declined by 10 percent.
On the basis of these data, reference [6] In addition to changes in population, high school graduation, and college enrollment, decision-makers are interested in how the changing racial/ethnic mix of the youth population will affect recruiting.
Whites are slowly becoming a smaller fraction of the population, as the Hispanic and Asian presence grows. Because performance on the AFQT is highly correlated with race and ethnic group, some have been concerned about the impact on the supply of high-quality enlisted recruits. We investigate this issue in the next few slides.
In the above data, "White," "Asian and Other," and "African-American" refer to non-Hispanic members of these populations. If the Navy racial/ethnic distribution resembles the distribution in society, the Navy faces roughly the same level of difficulty recruiting within each racial/ethnic group. Thus, if the two distributions match, changes in society's distribution will have little effect on the Navy's ability to bring in enough people. As the data above show, the Navy's recruiting mix is fairly representative of the current proportions among 17-to 26-year-olds in society, although whites and Hispanics are somewhat underrepresented and the other categories somewhat overrepresented.
The recruiting mix is even more representative of national proportions when limited to recruits who score in the upper mental group (UMG) on the AFQT and are high school diploma graduates (HSDGs). (UMG refers to scores at or above the 50th percentile on the AFQT.) This suggests that, even if the population of one group grows over time relative to another, the effect on the military's ability to find UMG recruits will be slight. The racial/ethnic changes expected through 2010 should result in a decrease of about 1 percent in UMG recruits, all else equal.
Why is the Navy able to achieve a representative racial/ethnic distribution of recruits? Large differences across racial/ethnic categories appear to cancel each other out in their effects on recruiting. Significant differences in test score distributions and high school graduation rates across the categories, taken in isolation, would suggest that it would be somewhat harder for the Navy to recruit qualified Hispanics and even more difficult to recruit qualified African-Americans. But fewer civilian employment opportunities available to military-qualified members of these groups and differences in propensity to serve apparently come close to offsetting the test score and high school degree effects. A recent CNA study [7] analyzed ASVAB scores from tests administered as part of the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 97). The average AFQT score was about 5 points (on a 100-point scale) higher in the 1997 sample than in the 1979 sample. Data from other sources, such as the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), provide evidence that test scores have risen some since 1979.
It is not clear, however, that the average score has risen by as much as 5 AFQT points. Certain groups are underrepresented in the NLSY 97: respondents from both high and low socioeconomic status (SES) households, respondents with low levels of education, and respondents from the older portion of the age distribution (which ranges from 18 to 23). Thus, [7] concludes that "NLSY 97 is likely to be missing correspondingly large fractions of high and low ASVAB scores. The effect is likely to be greatest for Hispanics. Any ASVAB norms resulting from these data will surely be biased unless this distortion is corrected." The study recommends, among other things, that the NLSY 97 be reweighted on respondents' race, gender, age, education, and SES.
The reweighting is likely to reduce but not eliminate the increase in test scores over the 1979 to 1997 time period. Should OSD use the NLSY97 to renorm the ASVAB, the existing standards of 31 AFQT to enter the Navy and 50 AFQT to be UMG will become more restrictive, placing an additional burden on recruiting. OSD is expected to decide the renorming issue early in FY01.
14 Veteran Representation in the Population Is Decreasing
• About 33 percent of Navy recruits have a parent who served in the military • Veteran share of population one of the most significant recruiting factors • However, changing composition of veterans may improve recruiting -More will be from the all-volunteer force, fewer will be from the Vietnam era or hollow-force years -At this point, an untested hypothesis
The number of veterans in the population influences the propensity of youth to join the military. The Navy's New Recruit Survey shows that about 33 percent of Navy recruits have a parent who served in the military. This is about 3 times as large as one would expect from sampling society at random. Presumably, veterans influence propensity through the exposure to and knowledge of the military that they provide to the younger generation.
For this reason, it is troubling for the prospect of Navy recruiting that the veteran share of the population is shrinking. A1996 CNRC report [1] explored the role of the under-65 veteran population in influencing enlistment and provided a projection of the veteran share of the population. The study found that veteran share was one of the most significant predictors of youth enlistment behavior. As an example from the study, veteran influence appeared to explain why Fairfax County, Virginia, is a much better source for recruits than Montgomery County, Maryland, even though both counties have similar household income and unemployment rates. CNRC reports that the veteran share of population will drop from just under 6 percent in 1998 to just over 4 percent in 2008 (a backup slide shows the longer term trend).
The good news is that the composition of the veteran population is changing. Veterans will increasingly be from the all-volunteer force. Fewer will have been drafted. Furthermore, fewer will have served in the turbulent Vietnam era or during the hollow-force years of the late 1970s. For instance, youth turning 18 between 2000 and 2008 will have been born between 1982 and 1990. Parents who were in the service during those years may pass down better impressions of the military than did veterans who left the service before die 1980s. Thus, the changing composition of veterans may mitigate the negative impact of declining numbers. However, the CNRC study did not distinguish between different types of veterans. To the best of our knowledge, no such study exists. The recruiting benefit of the all-volunteer force remains an untested hypothesis. Therefore, we rely on previous research to estimate the impact that the declining veteran presence will have on enlistment.
What About the Economy?
Economy unlikely to get stronger-no additional negative effect on recruiting -Depends on DoD increasing pays to keep pace with inflation of civilian wages However, competition for more skilled or higher quality sailors may increase
How will the economy affect recruiting over the next decade? Because the time frame of our analysis is longer than the horizon of most reliable forecasts, the answer is uncertain. At this point, the most reasonable prediction is that the economy will not cause additional deterioration of the recruiting environment.
The civilian labor market is unlikely to become much stronger than it is now. The last time that the unemployment rate was as low (4.1 percent) as it is now was 1970. The longest expansion in U.S. business cycle history lasted from 1961 to 1969. The current expansion has lasted almost as long.
What if the unemployment rate does not get lower, but remains at its current rate? Might recruiting become more and more difficult as the labor market continues to be strong? We don't expect pay-based competition from the civilian sector to become more intense than it is now. As a backup slide indicates, inflation-adjusted civilian wages have increased only slightly since 1992. Overall, the relationship between unemployment and (inflation-adjusted) wages is weak. As long as DoD boosts pay each year to keep up with inflation, there is no reason to expect increased recruiting problems.
Over the long run, changes in the composition of employment may pose challenges independent of the unemployment rate. Many experts believe that both military and civilian employers will need a greater concentration of highly skilled workers in the future. Again, the added burden on recruiting depends in part on military compensation. According to [8] , a more flexible, skill-based salary system would be needed to attract these workers.
Moral Qualifications
Projections unavailable-recent trends are best guide to future In 1998, 26 percent of high school seniors used an illicit drug at least once in a 30-day period Prison incarceration of youth aged 18-24 increased 50 percent during 1990 through 1996
Our analysis does not yet include the effects of changes in drug use and crime/incarceration on recruiting. However, there is nothing to suggest that recent trends in either of these factors will be detrimental to recruiting.
Drug use among high school seniors has increased in recent years but experienced a small downturn in 1998. We were unable to find published projections of future drug use, and recommend that the services expect 1998 patterns to continue into the future. A backup slide shows trends in drug and alcohol use in more detail.
Although we were unable to locate data on criminal convictions broken down by age, we did find youth incarceration data. Youth incarcerations have increased significantly in recent years but still reflect less than 1 percent of the population. The 50-percent increase since 1990 may be the result of longer sentences, increased youth felony activity, increased felony convictions, or many other factors. This trend will have affected military recruiting if some of the youth that would not have been incarcerated in the past would have been recruited by the military. For example, the Navy recruits sailors with prior arrest histories, but it looks more harshly at convictions. If incarceration continues to increase, it may reduce the supply of recruits. However, we were unable to find projections of future incarceration. Again, it is reasonable to expect 1996 patterns-sketched on a backup slide-to continue into the future.
Combined Effects
Increase in youth population 15 percent
Increase in youth population needed to offsetIncreased DoD recruiting goals 9 percent Decreasing veteran population 7 percent Changing racial/ethnic composition 1 percent Change in college enrollment pattern 0 percent Continued strong economy scenario 0 percent Renorming of ASVAB unknown Changes in drugs/crime unknown Net increase to help (hurt) recruiting (2) percent
The main question of this analysis is, "How will demographic trends affect the services' ability to meet recruiting goals in the future?" As our starting point we take the projected increase in the age 17-26 population from 1998 to 2008 of 15.3 percent (from 36.1 million to 41.6 million). Then we create a calculation for each factor, solving for the minimum rate at which the youth population must grow simply to offset the effect of that factor on recruiting.
DoD's combined recruiting goal will rise by 9 percent from FY98 to FY05. (FY05 is the last year that DoD has four-service projections.) All else equal, DoD could recruit the same fraction of the 17-26 population that it did in 1998 and meet the 2005-2008 goal of 196,000 accessions with room to spare. The minimum population growth necessary to meet the goal while recruiting a fixed share of the youth population is 9 percent.
Our calculations also indicate that the youth population would have to increase by 7 percent simply to offset the projected 18 percent decline in veteran population. In effect, growth in enlisted supply will be 8 percent, not 15 percent. Therefore, the services will need to recruit a larger share of the youth population than it has in the past in order to meet goals.
Expected changes in the youth racial/ethnic composition will have a small effect on the quality of people available (by itself, it will not affect quantity). All else equal, the changes will reduce the supply of upper mental group (UMG) recruits by about 1 percent. If the services are willing to accept lower quality recruits, additional population growth would not be necessary for it to reach goals. Population would need to increase 1 percent to compensate for the changing distribution and sustain the same fraction of UMG recruits.
We found that recruiting has suffered considerably from increases in college enrollment over the past 10 years. However, government projections suggest that the situation shouldn't worsen over the next 10 years. We were unable to arrive at solid predictions of the number of noncollege-bound high school graduates. However, it is reasonable to conclude that college will not continue to drain the recruitable population. Therefore, no additional population growth is needed to offset the effect of college enrollment.
An economic recession is going to happen, but we don't know when. Reliable forecasts (e.g., through IY01) don't indicate a turnaround any time soon. The economy is so strong right now that we feel only two scenarios present themselves in the near future: the economy stays strong (neutral effect on recruiting), or the economy weakens (helpful effect on recruiting). Over the long term, however, the services may want a greater concentration of high quality youth. This will lead to intensified competition with civilian employers.
Projections on moral qualification factors-drugs and crime-are not available, but the best guess is that their effects on recruiting will be neutral. Finally, it will take a year or two to determine what the effects of ASVAB renorming will be.
Overall, population growth is expected to be almost enough to support increased goals, assuming a continued strong economy and neutral effects from ASVAB renorming, drugs, and crime.
How Might Recruiting Spending Need To Change?
Total spending will need to increase to take full advantage of increased population -Costs of contacting, recruiting more young people -Spending per recruit may also increase to overcome negative effects of other factors
Cost change depends on quality of recruits desired as goal increases -Historical tendency for goal and quality to be inversely related for Navy
An estimate of how much recruiting will cost in the future is beyond the scope of this analysis, but we can make some general predictions.
With higher goals, spending would increase even if there were no negative factors bearing on the future recruiting environment (e.g., fewer veterans). Attracting and recruiting a greater population of young people will still require more recruiters, advertising, and the like. In other words, the projected population increase cannot be fully exploited unless the services increase recruiting resources as well as goals.
As we have already seen, negative factors mean that services must recruit a higher share of the youth population than it has in the past. This is likely to drive up costs per recruit; it must either spend more to get high-quality youth, or accept lower quality. In general, additional costs depend on the services' willingness to accept lower quality personnel. Once quality goals are determined, the services will be in a better position to estimate added costs.
Many analysts believe that the Navy will need higher quality youth in the future [6, 8] . However, the increased goal will have an impact on quality, all else equal. One study found that for the Navy, the higher the goal, the lower the number of contracts with high quality recruits [9] . The balance is difficult to predict. To overcome the pressures to reduce quality in the face of increased goals, additional resources will need to go toward recruiting (or retaining) high-quality people.
Policies To Overcome the Negative Effect
• To limit increase in DoD recruiting goals -Boost retention with compensation or other measures
• To limit effect of declining veteran population -Sustained increases in recruiting advertising
• To limit effect of college attendance -Adopt initiatives for community college recruiting -Target compensation to sustain those initiatives
• To limit effect of renorming the ASVAB -Reset cut scores required for individual ratings -Recalculate UMG requirement based on new cut scores
The Navy has several options to try to improve the prospect for recruiting, concentrating on the factors listed previously. Instead of counting on a weaker economy to tip the balance, or compromising quality, the Navy should adjust to changing conditions. Higher retention will reduce recruiting goals, thereby easing the prospect for recruiting. Retention may increase from compensation increases that are already being considered (e.g., increases in reenlistment bonuses, pay table reform, rescinding retirement redux, sea pay reform), from additional compensation increases, or from nonmonetary improvements (e.g., improvements in working conditions, improved and more accessible education benefits, and quality-of-life improvements). It is more difficult to find an offset to the effect of a declining veteran population. Perhaps sustained increases in recruiting advertising can, over the long run, replace some of the effect of "selling the military" that veterans provide now. And, as we have proposed, the changing composition of veterans in the population may help to mitigate the effect of reduced numbers. Several initiatives are under way to make it easier for the Navy to recruit college-bound youth, especially those bound for community colleges or technical/ vocational schools (e.g., [10] ). Examples include tech prep partnerships with community colleges and the Navy college program. Another idea is to offer high school seniors a scholarship for one or two semesters of community college before entering the Navy, with their Navy training finishing the requirements for a 2-year college degree. To appeal to the community college market, the Navy will probably have to adapt a specialized compensation system that can be targeted to those individuals.
ASVAB renorming will probably take place in about two years. The renorming will make existing standards more restrictive, but offsetting actions are possible. As the Navy did coincident with the last renorming, it should reset the cut scores required for individual ratings, so it will be no more difficult to qualify for a rating after the renorming than before. This should reduce the Navy's requirement for recruits in the upper mental group (UMG) of the AFQT distribution. Source: [13] Small reduction N #VVVVVV ^^^^^^^\^^^ jf Drug-related entry restrictions vary over time and across services, but illicit drug use has always posed a challenge to recruiting. Youths with histories of drug use may fail to qualify for service, or may attrite from training. Alcohol use is also a predictor of attrition. A recent CNA study found that boot camp attrition for occasional drinkers was 3 percentage points greater than for those who never drank [11] .
These data describe the survey responses of high school seniors in the University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future Study (MFS) [13] , which is updated annually. We could find no projections of youth drug and alcohol use. One predictor is how younger students-today's 8th graders-respond to the survey now.
The fact that we could not find long-term MFS projections of youth drug use suggests that the present provides the best guide to the future. We suggest that policy-makers use current estimates of prevalence of drug and alcohol use among youth. Source: [14] 18-19 20-24
Prison incarcerations have increased 50 percent among youth, and across other age groups as well. Among the adult population as a whole, the rate has increased by 44 percent since 1990 [14] . N12  N122  N13  N13T  N132  N7B  N81  N813  N813E  N869  N879C  N889 
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